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Fourteen years after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), border-crossing re-
strictions still remain with Mexico. Although studies have analyzed the impact of NAFTA trade liberalization, there has 
only been limited research on effects of informal trade barriers on U.S.–Mexico grain and soybean flows. This paper 
quantitatively measures the impact of logistic barriers impeding U.S.–Mexico grain and soybean trade. A conditional 
model testing for the presence of asymmetries in grain trade suggests that logistic barriers and transshipments are cor-
related. Econometric analysis rejects the null hypothesis of conditional independence, thereby implying the presence 
of asymmetries in grain transshipment markets. 
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Recent research pointed out the relevance of the 
impact of non-tariff trade barriers on international 
trade (De Groot et al. 2004). Among such barriers 
are sanitary restrictions, information costs related to 
physical (and cultural) distances, and institutional 
effects on trade flows (De Groot et al. 2004). Ac-
cording to De Groot et al. (2004) formal rules affect 
informal norms of behavior and inter-personal trust 
which influence the way of doing businesses, affect-
ing risk perceptions and preferences in international 
trade. Some of these barriers are also defined as 
informal barriers. Informal barriers vary in form 
and have an indirect impact on trade (Menzie and 
Prentice 1987). These barriers include technical 
and health regulations, government procurement 
and distribution policies, various government sub-
sidies and financial aids, transportation policies, 
and technical and administrative requirements. Al-
though the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) has been in existence for 14 years, border-
crossing restrictions still remain with Mexico, the 
second-largest U.S. agricultural-export destination. 
Bottlenecks include paperwork restrictions, customs 
clearance, health and sanitary restrictions, hours of 
services, second fumigations, road conditions, and 
port infrastructure issues that hamper U.S.–Mexico 
commodity flows. These land and ocean border-
crossing restrictions can add significant costs to 
U.S. shipments to Mexico. Although several stud-
ies have analyzed the impact of trade liberalization 
by NAFTA, only a limited effort has been devoted 
to analyzing the impact of informal trade barriers 
on the U.S.–Mexico grain and soybean flow. This 
paper quantitatively measures the impact of logistic 
barriers that are more likely to hamper U.S.–Mexico 
grain and soybean trade.
Overview of U.S.–Mexico Corn, Wheat, and 
Soybean Trade
Mexico is the second-largest destination, after Can-
ada, of U.S. agricultural exports, estimated at $12.3 
billion in 2007. U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico 
are forecast to increase to $13.7 billion in 2008 due 
to higher export unit values, stronger export demand 
for corn and cotton, and continued rapid growth of 
Mexico’s middle class which is boosting import 
demand for a wide range of high-value products 
(ERS 2007b). Bulk commodities accounted for 63 
percent of the total 28.9 million metric tons (mmt) 
of U.S. agricultural products exported to Mexico 
in 2006 (FAS 2007). Coarse grains represented 
57 percent of total bulk agricultural shipments to 
Mexico. Soybeans and wheat accounted for 20 and 
12 percent of the total 18.3 mmt of bulk exports, 
respectively.
Mexico processes much of its production of 
white corn into food products for human consump-
tion. Approximately 30 percent of total Mexican 
corn consumption is imported. Almost the entirety 
of that 30 percent comes from the United States and 
consists of yellow corn for livestock feed to support 
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During 2006, United States’ corn exports to Mexico 
increased 34 percent from the previous year, to 7.83 
mmt. More than half of the U.S. corn exported to 
Mexico was used as animal feed in 2004 (Adcock, 
Rosson, and Varela 2007). Thirty-seven percent was 
made into corn starch and 9.4 percent was used for 
flour, cereals, and snack foods. 
Effective January 1, 2003, under NAFTA Mexico 
eliminated tariffs on almost all agri-food products 
with the exception of poultry, eggs, dairy, and 
sugar. However, corn and dry beans were subject 
to Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) until January 1, 2008 
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada 2006). When 
corn tariffs were eliminated in 2008, Mexico’s 
imports of kibble or cracked corn, which were free 
of tariffs because they were processed, began to be 
replaced by imports of whole-grain corn (Hoffman 
et al. 2007). Over-quota U.S. white corn exports 
to Mexico were subject to import tariffs (72.6 
percent in 2004, 54.5 percent in 2005, 36.3 per-
cent in 2006, and 18.1 percent in 2007). The 2007 
NAFTA corn TRQ was 3.672 mmt. Early in 2007, 
in accordance with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Mexico’s Secretary of Economy announced 
two additional unilateral corn TRQs totaling 2.9 
mmt of corn imported from Most Favored Nations 
(MFN). The TRQ was estimated at 86 percent for 
yellow corn and 14 percent for white corn (Juarez 
2007a, 2007b). 
Mexico is the third-largest world sorghum pro-
ducer after Nigeria and the United States and the 
second-largest world consumer after Nigeria. In 
2006, Mexico imported 28 percent of its sorghum, 
mostly from the United States (FAS 2007; SIAP/
SAGARPA 2007). Sorghum is used exclusively 
for animal feed in Mexico (Adcock, Rosson, and 
Varela 2007). Mexican feeders are accustomed to 
feeding sorghum because corn imports have been 
limited by Mexican government policies (Hoffman 
et al. 2007). 
The United States and Canada are the major sup-
pliers of wheat to Mexico. The U.S. wheat market 
share in Mexico varies from year to year because 
of Canadian competition, which is based on quality 
and price (ERS 2007c, 2007d). U.S. wheat exports to 
Mexico consist mostly of Hard Red Winter (HRW) 
wheat due to the proximity of the large HRW wheat 
growing areas in the southern plains to the Mexican 
border. As a result of NAFTA, there are no tariffs on 
U.S. and Canadian wheat exports to Mexico.
Mexico is the world’s fourth-largest world soy-
bean importer, after China, the EU-25, and Japan. 
Mexican domestic production has virtually been 
displaced by U.S. imports due to Mexico’s reform 
of its domestic-crop-support program, elimination 
of soybean tariffs as a result of NAFTA, and im-
provements in rail transportation links at the border 
(Ash, Livezey, and Dohlman 2006). In addition, 
strong income growth among Mexican consumers 
has boosted consumption of meat and vegetable 
oils and increased demand for soybeans. The fol-
lowing sections outline the various restrictions 
and requirements the United States and Mexican 
governments place upon grain shipments flowing 
across the border.
Regulatory Environment
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are 
nontariff trade barriers (NTBs) that impede trade, 
affecting its flow and magnitude. To assess the eco-
nomic impact on trade flows of NTBs it is crucial to 
understand not only the grain and soybeans phytos-
anitary regulations but also their implementation at 
the U.S.–Mexico border. Regulation implementa-
tion varies by border-crossing points depending on 
the inspector’s interpretation of the law and hours 
of service. 
United  States  Grain  Export  and  Import 
Requirements
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)1 is 
responsible for providing the nation with safe and 
affordable food. Within this mission, the Agency’s 
responsibilities have been divided between two 
agencies: the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stock-
yards Administration (GIPSA 2007) and the Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS 
2007). GIPSA’s Federal Grain Inspection Service 
(FGIS 2007) is responsible for providing sampling, 
inspection, process verification, and weighing and 
stowage examination services that accurately and 
consistently describes the quality and quantity of 
the commodities being bought and sold in the na-
tion, while APHIS is responsible for protecting 
1 The Food and Drug Administration protects public health 
and regulates food, medical devices, biologics, animal feed, 
drugs, cosmetics, and radiation-emitting products, but it is not 
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America’s animal and plant resources. In addition, 
the United States Customs and Border Protection 
(USCBP 2007) agency of the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS 2007) performs phytosanitary 
inspections for all imports to the United States. CBP 
is responsible for protecting the nation’s borders 
in order to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons 
from entering the United States, while facilitating 
the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 
GIPSA Requirements
GIPSA requirements to export U.S. grain, oilseeds 
or related commodities from the United States 
vary based on whether the commodity (Table 1) 
is covered by the United States Grain Standards 
Act (USGSA) or the Agricultural Marketing Act 
of 1946 (AMA).
GIPSA is required to certify the quality and 
weight of all export shipments of grain covered 
by USGSA. GIPSA also is required to test all corn 
exports for aflatoxin, unless the contract stipulates 
testing is not required. Mandatory inspections and 
weighing are required for all U.S. ocean grain 
shipments to the rest of the world. However, these 
requirements do not apply to grain exported by rail 
or truck to Canada or Mexico.
APHIS Requirements
APHIS does not regulate grain and soybean exports 
to Mexico. Therefore APHIS cannot prohibit grain 
exports for lack of phytosanitary certificates. APHIS 
issues phytosanitary certificates in response to ex-
porters’ requests to meet Mexico’s requirements. 
APHIS has a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the GIPSA/Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) 
that allows it to sample and conduct phytosanitary 
inspections on behalf of APHIS. APHIS requires 
only an import permit for corn, wheat, sorghum, and 
soybeans imported from Mexico (Lamb 2007).
Mexican Phytosanitary Import Requirements
Mexico’s phytosanitary requirements for the di-
rect import of grains and seeds except for planting 
(SAGARPA 2006a), and not aimed at processing, 
transformation, and industrialization are: 
Table 1. List of Export Commodities Required to Be Inspected under the U.S Grain Standards Act 
(USGSA) and the Agricultural Marketing Act (AMA).






Barley Yes Rice No
Canola Yes Beans (dry edible) No
Corn Yes Peas No
Flaxseed Yes Lentils No
Oats Yes Hops No
Rye Yes Processed grain products(e.g., No
Sorghum Yes flour, cornmeal, soybean meal, 




Mixed Grain Yes  
*Anyone exporting 15,000 tons or more per year must register with GIPSA.
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a) International Phytosanitary Certificate (CFI) 
issued by the National Organization of 
Phytosanitary Protection of the country of 
origin, which indicates the place of origin of 
the product.
b)  Phytosanitary inspection at the entry point 
into the country required for verifying the 
compliance of this Standard.
i)  If during the inspection live insects are not 
detected, the shipment will be released and 
it may enter the national territory.
ii) If during the inspection the presence of 
living insects is detected, a quarantine 
treatment shall be applied and the ship-
ment then will be released. The interested 
party will choose one of the authorized 
treatments.2 The detected live insect will 
be sent for identification to a laboratory ap-
proved by the National Service for Animal 
and Plant Health, Food Safety and Quality 
(SENASICA) of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fish-
ing and Nutrition (SAGARPA).
c) Additional requirements by species and coun-
try of origin must be met as indicated in Table 
2.
Treatment Certification at the Origin
When treatment is applied at country of origin, the 
dosage specifications, exposure time, and product 
must be indicated on the CFI issued by the National 
Organization of Phytosanitary Protection from the 
country of origin. In case the quarantine treatments 
are not specified or if they are different from those 
indicated in the standard, entry into Mexico will be 
conditional upon the application of the correspond-
ing treatment at the entry point.
Railroad, Maritime, and Truck Transportation
Railroad, maritime, and truck transportation con-
tainers or packing used for the import of the prod-
ucts indicated in the present standard must be free 
of plant material debris. Where plant material and 
soil debris are detected, they must be cleaned and 
sprayed with a licensed chemical product having a 
current valid record with the Inter-ministerial Com-
2 The exact method of treatment can be found in SAGARPA 
(2006).
Table 2. Mexico Additional Phytosanitary Import Requirements by Specie and Country of Origin.
Requirement # Product Origin Phytosanitary treatment
G078 Corn and 
popcorn
U.S.A. Aluminum phosphide TFA treatment applied at the 
country of origin is allowed. Otherwise, treatment T302 
(d1), T302 (d2) or TFA will be applied at point of entry 
in Mexico.
G092 Soybeans U.S.A. Aluminum phosphide TFA treatment applied at the 
country of origin is allowed. Otherwise, treatment T302 
(d1), T302 (d2) or TFA will be applied at point of entry 
in Mexico.
G095 Wheat* U.S.A. Aluminum phosphide TFA treatment applied at the 
country of origin is allowed. Otherwise, treatment T302 
(d1), T302 (d2) or TFA will be applied at point of entry 
in Mexico.
*Additional requirements: the CFI must indicate that the shipment is free of Tilletia controversa and in the case of Tilletia indica 
must indicate that the shipment has not originated from Arizona, California, New Mexico, or the south of Texas (El Paso, Hudspeth, 
Culberson, Jeff Davis, and Presidio). 
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mission for the Control in the Process and Use of 
Pesticides, Fertilizers and Toxic Substances (CICO-
PLAFEST) and approved for authorized use for this 
purpose. If any plant material or soil debris is de-
tected in or on the tops of the railcars or trucks, their 
entry into the country is not permitted. In this case, 
SAGARPA officials will notify other entry-inspec-
tion locations to alert them of the railcars or trucks 
that contain the debris. Cleaning of carriers must 
be done outside of the national territory. Railroad 
cars where plant material or soil waste is detected 
must not enter Mexico until they comply.
Phytosanitary Inspection
SENASICA official personnel inspect the grains and 
seeds (except those intended for planting), vehicle 
packing, and packing materials and review the ship-
ment documentation before or at the entry point into 
Mexico. When a shipment is in compliance with the 
regulations of NOM-006-FITO-1995, SENASICA 
officials sign the Sanitary Import Permit (SIP). The 
SIP specifies the grain’s intended use and destina-
tion in Mexico. Mexican Customs officials must 
also sign the SIP before the shipment is officially 
released. 
When SAGARPA becomes aware of any poten-
tially harmful phytosanitary conditions in an export-
ing country, they conduct a pest-risk assessment. 
Based on the result of the pest-risk assessment, 
SAGARPA will issue corresponding phytosanitary 
measures for minimizing risk of introducing these 
quarantine pests into Mexico. When it is verified 
that the stated products regulated in the standard 
do not comply with the respective phytosanitary 
provisions, SAGARPA will refuse entry and order 
their return, destruction, or reconditioning, with the 
cost being borne by the importer or by an interested 
party.
Based on the Federal Act of Vegetable Sanitation, 
SAGARPA randomly monitors the grain and seeds, 
except those intended for planting, imported for pro-
cessing, transformation, and industrialization; their 
transport and management under conditions that 
prevent product leakage, to assure that the product 
arrived at the declared final destination; and that 
there is compliance with the processing, transfor-
mation and industrialization systems approved by 
SAGARPA (2006).
U.S.–Mexico Border-Crossing Restrictions for 
Corn, Wheat, and Soybean Trade 
The implementation of Mexican phytosanitary 
regulations at the U.S.–Mexico border is the main 
source of delays in U.S. grain and soybeans enter-
ing Mexico. Inspection processes vary by point of 
entry. During the process, five major sources of train 
delays have been identified (Table 3).
Hours of Operation
National Service for Animal and Plant Health, Food 
Safety and Quality (SENASICA) hours of service: 
The hours of operation are limited by the Mexican 
Law of Administrative Procedures which prohibits 
federal inspectors from working overtime. SENA-
SICA sampling usually occurs in the cooler morning 
hours. Hours of operations vary by point of entry.
The Nuevo Laredo office is open Monday 
through Friday, 8:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m. The office is 
closed on weekends and holidays but they do inspect 
the tops of railcars for plant material and soil debris 
24 hours per day, seven days a week during the year. 
Sampling is performed Monday through Friday by 
private contractors. With advance notice, sampling 
may be done on weekends.
The Matamoros office is open Monday through 
Friday, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m. and until 4:00 p.m. on 
Saturday. Inspections may continue until 5:00 p.m. 
on Saturday. If SENASICA does not complete their 
sampling by 5:00 p.m., they will continue the next 
morning or next business day. Sampling is done by 
private contractors.
The Ciudad Juarez office is open Monday 
through Friday, 8:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m., and from 9:00 
a.m. until noon on Saturday. Sampling is done by 
SENASICA inspectors.
Number of Inspectors
There are a limited number of SENASICA inspec-
tors due to Mexico budget constraints. For example, 
in Nuevo Laredo, the busiest border crossing, there 
are only 13 inspectors for all agricultural products.
Documentation Requirements
Determination of what is considered an original 
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natures or color of ink; some inspectors require 
documents to be signed in blue ink as opposed to 
black ink in order to distinguish an original docu-
ment from one which is a photocopy.
Second Fumigation
A second fumigation at the border is not required 
unless live insects are detected during the inspec-
tion process. 
Cleaning the Tops of Railcars
The tops of all railcars must be clean. It is the re-
sponsibility of the U.S. railroads to clean the top of 
the car. However, rail cars are allowed to be cleaned 
in Mexico. The collected debris is returned to the 
U.S. in a designated boxcar. Likewise, debris col-
lected from the empty railcars returning to the 
U.S. is sent back to Mexico in the same designated 
boxcar. 
To understand the delays at the U.S.–Mexico 
border, it is critical to comprehend the border-cross-
ing clearance process. This process involves:
1. Export document handling
2. National Service for Animal and Plant Health, 
Food Safety and Quality (SENASICA) in-
spection processes 
3. Custom agency release
4. Sanitary import permit
Export Document Handling
The sequence of events is as follows: original export 
documents are handled from the inspection agency 
to the exporter to the U.S. freight forwarder to the 
U.S. broker to the Mexican broker to the Mexican 
customs agent and finally to the SENASICA and 
Mexican Customs (Figure 1). The Mexican govern-
ment requires original copies of certificates. GIPSA 
issues official grain inspection and weight certifi-
cates, while APHIS issues official phytosanitary 
certificates. Certificates with typos are not accepted 
Table 3. U.S.–Mexico Border Crossing Average Delays by Selected Point of Entry*.
Description Delays
Collection of original export documents, Fig. 1 48–72 hrs.
Export documents clearance: 1–3 days
Identification of dirty cars: < 1 hr.
a) by circuit cameras  Nuevo Laredo 
b) Cross net1 Matamoros and Ciudad Juarez
Clean top railcars2 by private contractors 1–2 days
10 percent random sample3 of railcar inspected by private contractor 1–2 hrs.
Second grain fumigation, paid by the importer4 48 hrs.
SENASICA issue sanitary import permit ($1,300) 2–3 hrs.
Mexican custom 2–24 hrs.
Sample cars reassemble to final destination 2 days–2 weeks
*Points of entry: Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo.
1Cross net: a person is seated on a 50–60 ft. stand with huge stadium lights looking at the top of the rail car under all weather 
conditions, 24 hrs/7days per week. The train moves continuously at about 1 mph.
2Dirty cars have a weight tolerance of 50 pounds of grain debris on top of a single railcar. If debris weight exceeds this limit, the car 
is rejected and returned to the United States for cleaning. All debris cleaned off cars is bagged and returned to the United States in 
a single box car designated for that purpose. Expenses are paid by U.S. railroads.
3Railcar sampling varies according to the commodity: 100 percent for soybeans, 40 percent–60 percent for wheat, ten percent for 
other grains. 
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because of the concern about fraudulent documents. 
There is no consistency for the signatures’ color of 
ink; some inspectors require documents to be signed 
in blue ink while others in black ink. Shipping of 
original documents by overnight mail might take 
48–72 hrs. It should be noted that SENASICA’s 
inspectors do not get paid overtime for after-hours, 
holidays, and weekend inspections. In addition, 
some inspection offices require the export docu-
ments to be delivered no later than by 2:30 p.m. 
Monday through Friday, while others may require 
the documents no later than by noon on Friday. No 
SENASICA offices process the export documents 
on weekends or holidays. Currently, SENASICA is 
working to change the interpretation of the Mexican 
Law of Administrative Process to redefine “original 
document” in order to expedite the clearance pro-
cess. In this way, electronic certificates available 
over the internet will be accepted as originals. As 
of June, 2007, GIPSA began issuing inspection 
certificates online and APHIS is in the process of 
implementing this procedure as well.
SENASICA Inspection Processes
After SENASICA reviews and clears all export 
documents, trains are allowed to enter Mexico and 
to proceed to the SENASICA inspection station 
close to the border. Railcar sampling is usually 
performed by private contractors. FGIS does not 
consider Mexican samples representative because 
their sampling procedures are not consistent at all 
entry gateways and when sampling they use a four-
foot-long open-throat probe, which does not obtain 
a representative sample. FGIS uses a 12-foot-long 
compartmented probe for sampling to reach the 
bottom of the railcar. 
SENASICA requires that ten percent of all grain 
railcars be inspected except for soybeans and wheat. 
In the latter case, 100 percent of soybean railcars 
are sampled due to concerns about Asian soybean 
rust (Phakopsora pachyrhizi). Samples are sent to a 
local private laboratory for analysis. The laborato-
ries are usually chosen by the buyer. Furthermore, 
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*The same person can be the U.S. freight forwarder, U.S. broker, and the Mexican broker.
**Usually , the same person.  The Mexican broker hand deliver documents to SENASICA.
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certifying that soybeans contain less than 2.0 per-
cent of foreign material. If there is a quarantine 
concern, such as Tilletia controversa J.G. Kühn 
(TCK) smut in wheat shipments, SENASICA will 
send the samples to a Mexican-government-ac-
credited laboratory for further analysis. Sampling 
for wheat shipments varies between 40–60 percent 
of the shipments. Wheat originating from areas that 
had Karnal bunt (Tilletia indica) outbreaks requires 
a 60-percent sampling. All wheat shipments must 
be certified as free of TCK smut. 
SENASICA inspects all railcar exteriors for 
cleanliness. Railcars arriving with plant and soil 
debris on top must be cleaned by a private contrac-
tor paid by the U.S. railroads. A private fumigation 
company, paid by the importer, fumigates railcars 
because all grain entering Mexico must be fumi-
gated with aluminum phosphide3 or methyl bromide 
at origin or upon entering Mexico, in accordance 
with NOM-006-FITO-1995. Fumigation can take 
place in the United States, but it must be officially 
witnessed and documented by FGIS, State, or of-
ficial inspection personnel. If there is no documenta-
tion of observed fumigation, Mexico will require all 
cars to be re-fumigated in Mexico. Trains that are 
fumigated with aluminum phosphide at origin typi-
cally are allowed to enter Mexico once SENASICA 
clears all documents.
Customs Agency Release
Mexican Customs are open from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m. Monday through Friday and from 10:00 a.m. 
to 2:00 p.m. on Saturday. After SENASICA clears 
the documents and takes their samples, Mexican 
Customs will then inspect five to seven percent of 
the railcars to ensure proper tariffs were assessed. 
The railroad pulls the selected railcars from the train 
onto another track for Customs inspection. Once 
their inspection is done, they will sign the Sanitary 
Import Permit (SIP) and contact the railroad to 
switch those railcars back into the waiting train. 
The train is then released and allowed to proceed 
to the receiver once fumigation has finished. Al-
though the train is officially released by SENASICA 
and Customs authorities, the railcars may stay in the 
rail yards for two or more additional days before 
the train continues on its route. 
Data and Variables
Total U.S. corn, sorghum, wheat, and soybean 
export data to Mexico were obtained from the 
Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Foreign Trade Statistics, in the USDA/Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS), U.S. Trade Exports, 
FATUS Commodity Aggregations website (FAS 
2007). Modal-share transportation data were ob-
tained from several sources: data for grain shipped 
by rail was obtained from the Surface Transporta-
tion Board’s (STB) Carload Waybill Sample (STB 
2001-2005); data for grain shipped by ocean were 
obtained from the USDA/Grain Inspection, Packers 
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA 2007); and 
data for grain shipments by truck is the residual of 
total exports minus rail and ocean shipments. This 
study focuses on shipments by rail only.
There are no published data on the final destina-
tion of U.S. grain and soybean exports to Mexico. 
Major rail destinations in Mexico were estimated 
based on information from Adcock, Rosson, and 
Varela (2007) as well as from personal conver-
sations and observations made on site. Sanitary 
requirements were obtained from the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fishing and Nutrition (SAGARPA). U.S.–Mexico 
border-crossing restrictions were based on personal 
observations made on site. The logistic barriers 
variable represents delays generated by sanitary 
requirements and border-crossing restrictions 
based on personal observations on site. This is a 
discrete variable, capturing a bundle of border-
crossing restrictions. A significant coefficient for 
transshipments embodies asymmetric information 
between transshipments and logistic barriers. Also, 
the expected value of transshipments in the model 
specification accounts for the nonlinear effects of 
all variables on logistic barriers given that the goal 
is to test for correlation between logistic barriers 
and transshipments. 
Cost includes fumigation and rail-car cleaning 
charges/expenses at the Mexico border. The data 
were obtained from personal communications 
and observations on site. Grain transshipments 
capture the shipments of grain in million metric 
tons obtained from the Department of Commerce, 
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics (FAS 
2007). If the transshipments variable is not signifi-
cant, then the cross-border transshipment market 
3 Aluminum phosphide is the only fumigate approved to be 
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lacks the presence of asymmetries due to regula-
tions and other impediments or transshipments 
do not provide useful information in predicting 
conditionally informal policies that inhibit ship-
ments of grains and soybeans between the U.S. 
and Mexico.
The trains (number) variable represents the 
frequency, number, and size of trains crossing 
the border. Data were obtained from the Surface 
Transportation Board’s Carload Waybill Sample 
(STB 2007). Tonnage represents the shipments per 
average train size to account for dispersion and vari-
ability of train shipments. Cost refers to fumigation 
of soybean and wheat railcars with methyl bromide. 
Total cost was calculated to reflect the number of 
trains and cars by train. Dummy variables were used 
to capture possible differences in grain category 
transshipments assuming fixed effects specification. 
We specified two dummy variables, one for grains 
(corn and wheat) and the other for soybeans trans-
shipments. The Univariate method (Chan 1993) 
was used to develop quarterly data series from the 
annual data available in the Statistical Analysis 
System (SAS) 2003. 
Estimated  Border-Crossing  Restrictions 
Economic Impact: Model and Results
Theoretical Specification
The determinants of transshipments are usually ex-
amined within the framework of a standard gravity 
model with the usual explanatory variables of dis-
tance and country size to infer the impacts of insti-
tutions on trade flows (McCallum 1995; Obstfeld 
and Rogoff 2000; Grossman 1998; Trefler 1995). 
Because of the importance of transportation and 
trading costs, a rapidly growing literature is aimed 
at measuring and understanding trade border effects 
and barriers (Anderson and Smith 1999; Head and 
Ries 1999; Wolf 2000; Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu 
2002; Clark, Dollar, and Micco 2004). 
Unlike previous work, this paper attempts to ana-
lyze the impact (if any) of informal trade barriers 
on the U.S.–Mexico grain and soybeans transship-
ments. The dominant view today is that the regula-
tory process, formal or informal, is used by industry 
to erect entry restrictions for its own benefit (Stigler 
1971). Economic theory demonstrates that regula-
tory processes are associated with asymmetries of 
information that can hinder the efficient operation 
of markets. For this reason, advances in the litera-
ture of contracting and asymmetric information are 
employed to quantitatively evaluate the impact (if 
any) of informal trade barriers on the U.S.–Mexico 
grain and soybeans trade flows.
Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) theoretical 
model derives market-equilibrium conditions un-
der asymmetries of information. Puelz and Snow’s 
(1994) theoretical work developed measures of in-
formational asymmetries in the insurance and auto-
mobile markets. Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse 
(1998) model introduced the notion of conditional 
dependence in their effort to measure asymmetries 
of information. Chiappori and Heckman (2000), 
based on the notion of conditional dependence, 
developed the so-called “positive correlation” test 
to measure the presence of informational asym-
metries. This paper specifies a conditional model 
to analyze the factors that influence U.S.–Mexico 
grain and soybean transshipments and assert the 
economic impact of informal logistic barriers using 
the concept of conditional independence. Rejection 
of independence means that there is evidence of 
informational asymmetries in the U.S.–Mexico 
transshipment market (Chiappori and Salanie 2000; 
Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse 1998). In other 
words, if logistic barriers are correlated with grain 
and soybean transshipments, then there are asym-
metries of information on the U.S.–Mexico grain 
and soybean trade. 
Conditional Independence
Let Y be the endogenous variable under study or 
U.S. transshipments to Mexico, θ be the decision 
variable (in this case, logistic barriers), and X a 
matrix of exogenous variables. The decision vari-
able provides no additional information if and only 
if the prediction of f(Y) based on X and θ jointly 
coincides with its prediction based on X alone. This 
conclusion can be written in terms of conditional 
probabilities as
(1) f(Y/X,θ) = f(Y/X),
where f(./.,.) denotes a conditional probability-den-
sity function (Gourieroux and Monfort 1995). In 
this application, Y is transshipments, θ is logistic 
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The non-linear specification of Equation 1 means 
that the presence of logistic barriers, θ, provides no 
useful information in predicting transshipment, Y. 
In other words, if the equation above holds, then 
we can conclude that θ and Y are independent, 
conditionally on X. Equation 1 can be written in 
equivalent form as
(2) f(θ /X,Y) = f(θ /X),
where transshipments do not provide useful infor-
mation in predicting conditionally logistic barriers. 
This characterization may also be interpreted as the 
description of what the traders or transshipping 
companies would decide if there is no additional 
knowledge of logistic barriers (Dionne, Gourieroux, 
and Vanasse 2001). If traders have more information 
than do the agencies that impose the barriers, then 
the equality will not hold in Equation 2. In this ap-
plication, such a characterization was used.
“Conditional dependence” means conditional on 
all variables observed by the traders. That is, sev-
eral other factors—including the number of trains, 
the fumigation cost, and the type of grain—also 
influence the logistic barriers. The model that tests 
for independence of logistic barriers and transship-
ments should account for those factors. The econo-
metric model can also be used to control for factors 
that might affect logistic barriers. In this paper, the 
econometric model is specified in general form as 
(3) f(θ,Y/X) = f(θ,Y, E
^ (Y/X),X),
where E
^(Y/X) is the expected value of Y com-
puted from initial information. By introducing the 
estimated expectation of logistic barriers (E
^ (Y/X)) 
in Equation 3, any omitted non-linear effects are 
accounted for. That is, Equation 3 avoids the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing the informational content 
of a decision variable and any omitted non-linear 
effect of the initial exogenous variables (Dionne, 
Gourieroux, and Vanasse 2001). If the estimated co-
efficient of Y is no longer significant when E
^ (Y/X) 
is introduced into the model, this means that there 
are no informational asymmetries in the transship-
ment U.S.–Mexico market and logistic barriers have 
no impact on the grain and soybean trade flows. 
The relationship in Equation 3 was used to 
specify a two-limit Tobit model to analyze the 
impact of regulatory policies as
θL                                       if  θ* ≤ θL
(4)   θ = θ* = αy + λE(y/x) + xβ +εi  if  θL < θ* < θU  ,
θU                                       if  θ* ≥ θU
where θ is logistic barriers, which ranges from a 
minimum of ten percent (θL) to a maximum of 95 
percent (θU); α, λ, and β are regression coefficients; 
and εi is the residual that is independently and nor-
mally distributed. The two-limit Tobit model is ap-
propriate when the dependent variable is truncated 
at both high and low values (Long 1997; Maddala 
1987).4 In the case of logistic barriers measured 
as delays, there is a minimum of ten percent and a 
maximum coverage of 95 percent. The set of rel-
evant explanatory variables in Equation 4 includes 
the number of trains, the tonnage, the fumigation 
cost, and the type of grain (as described above). 
Econometric Results 
U.S.–Mexico grain and soybean transshipments 
were analyzed using a two-limit Tobit model de-
scribed in Equation 4 using the EViews (2007) 
statistical package. Variables closely related to the 
transshipping market’s characteristics were focus 
upon. Two non-linear models were estimated: 
Model 1 excludes the expected value of transship-
ments, while Model 2 includes the expected value of 
transshipments and it is used to test the correlation 
between logistic barriers and transshipments. 
In Model 1, logistic barriers are specified as a 
function of all available variables except the ex-
pected value of transshipments. The expected values 
of transshipments, E
^ (Y/X), are computed from an 
estimated negative binomial model of transship-
ments. Transshipments are estimated as a function 
of all the available information, X, using the nega-
tive binomial regression model Y = f(X) and then 
the expected value of Y or E
^ (Y/X) is computed. The 
expected value of transshipments is incorporated 
only into Model 2 to account for the nonlinear ef-
fects of explanatory variables. In Model 2, logistic 
barriers are specified as a function of all available 
variables including the expected value of trans-
shipments. The main goal is to test for correlation 
between the logistic barriers and transshipments. 
The econometric results suggest that logistic 
barriers and transshipments are correlated or that 
4 See Long (1997, pp. 212) or Maddala (1987, pp. 160) for 
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the null hypothesis of conditional independence 
is rejected, implying the presence of information 
asymmetries in grain transshipment markets. In 
Model 1, the transshipment coefficient is positive 
(0.09), implying that larger transshipments are more 
likely to face higher logistic barriers and vice versa. 
The z score (8.93) indicates that the transshipments 
coefficient is statistically significant at one-percent 
level of significance (Table 4). In Model 2, trans-
shipments and the expected value of transshipments 
have a strong positive relationship. In particular, 
the coefficients of transshipments and the expected 
value of transshipments are 0.11 and 12.12, respec-
tively, and they are statistically significant at the 
one-percent level of significance with z scores 18.38 
and 12.02, respectively (Table 4). These strong posi-
tive values indicate positive correlation between the 
logistic barriers and transshipment and imply the 
presence of asymmetries in the U.S.–Mexico grain 
and soybean trade flow markets. 
The results also indicate that logistic barriers de-
pend on cost, tonnage, number of trains, and types of 
commodity. Specifically, the results reveal a strong 
positive relationship between tonnage and logistic 
barriers in both models (Table 4). The estimated 
coefficients for Model 1 and Model 2 are 1.24 and 
1.33, respectively. The positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients (with z values 12.13 for Model 
1 and 21.57 for Model 2) indicate that traders with 
larger tonnage have a higher probability of facing 
increased logistic barriers. 
The estimated relationship between number 
of logistic barriers and trains is positive and sig-
nificant (Table 4), as trains with larger numbers of 
cars are more likely to face higher logistic barriers 
and vice versa. This reinforces the rejection of the 
null hypothesis and supports the notion of asym-
metrical information in the U.S.–Mexico grain 
and soybean transshipping markets. Specifically, 
the estimated coefficients are 0.18 and 0.10 for 
Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, and they are 
statistically significant at the one-percent level of 
significance, with z scores 11.55 for Model 1 and 
20.60 for Model 2.
As expected, the coefficient of inspection cost 
is positive, indicating that sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures impede trade and affect its flow and 
magnitude (Table 4) in the case of rail transship-





Conditional on transshipments and 
expected transshipments
Coefficient Z-ratio Coefficient Z-ratio
Intercept −2.19 −8.82* −3.53 −19.04*
Transshipments (Y)1 0.09 8.93* 0.11 18.38*
E
^ (Y/X)2     12.12 12.02*
Tonnage 1.24 12.13* 1.33 21.57*
Cost (average) 0.07 5.46* 0.11 13.22*
Trains (number)  0.18 11.55* 0.19 20.69*
Grain type1 (dummy) 0.29 3.23** 0.09 1.56
Grain type2 (dummy) 0.08 0.92 0.07 1.32
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.91
1 Y is the transshipments.
2 E
^ (Y/X) is the estimated expected transshipments.
* Statistically significant at one-percent level of significance.
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ments. Although the estimated coefficients are 
positive (0.07 for Model 1 and 0.11 for Model 2) 
and significant, their magnitude indicates a rather 
weak relationship with logistic barriers compared 
to the other explanatory variables in the models. 
Dummy variables were used to capture possible ef-
fects of logistic barriers and category of commodity 
(Dummy 1 for corn and wheat and Dummy 2 for 
soybeans). The estimated coefficients are positive 
but they are not statistically significant (Table 4), 
indicating that the differentiation of the type of 
commodity is not important. 
Conclusions and Further Research
This study specifies and tests for the presence of 
asymmetries in the U.S.–Mexico grain trade. The 
data pertain to U.S. corn, sorghum, soybean, and 
wheat quarterly transshipments for the crop year 
2002–2006. This study focuses on shipments by 
rail only.
The data gathered for the study provide an oppor-
tunity to test for asymmetries in U.S.–Mexico grain 
commodity flows. A conditional model is specified 
to estimate the economic impact of logistic barriers 
to U.S. corn, wheat, and soybean shipments to Mex-
ico. In other words, the conditional independence 
of logistic barriers and grain transshipments after 
accounting for transportation differences is tested. 
The model specification allows testing for asym-
metries in the U.S.–Mexico transshipping grain and 
soybean market using a parametric approach. The 
procedure rejects conditional independence between 
the logistic barriers and the transshipments, imply-
ing the presence of asymmetries between traders 
at border crossings. Findings provide insights into 
border-crossing grain shipments and the methodol-
ogy allows for an assessment of logistic barriers in 
U.S.–Mexico trade practices. 
Whether the problem of asymmetries is in-
trinsic to U.S.–Mexico grain transshipment or 
whether it is a consequence of policies applied is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, govern-
ment regulations might contribute to the presence 
of asymmetries as regulations and are a potential 
source of asymmetrically used information. For 
example, when policies or procedures are in place 
which allow traders to condition the shipments on 
well-established guidelines, then trade flows should 
greatly improve. Also, incentives to monitor prob-
lems generated by logistic barriers would reduce or 
eliminate asymmetries in the grain transshipments 
between the U.S. and Mexico.
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